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Meeting of Guatemalan Group
Tuesday, June 22, 1954

Present: Holland, Burrows, Col. Clark, Atwood, Jamison, Wieland, Woodward, Barren, Pearson, Leddy

1. Publicity

(a) Holland stressed again the importance of dissociating our power objectives against Communism from the UFCO problem. The material has been cabled to our embassies on this subject.

(b) Holland reported that he had drafted a section on the Guatemalan problem for the President's speech this evening. (This material was not used.)

(c) Holland decided against a speech on the UFCO for the time being in view of the proposed section for the President's speech.

2. Implementation of Draft Resolution

(a) Woodward was asked to complete his analysis of the specific plans for implementing the draft resolution. With respect to European ships, it was agreed that we would tell these countries to take necessary control measures so that we won't have to stop their ships, but we will not use force to stop them. It is most essential that we take the necessary steps in order to be in a position to stop all American republic ships. We need a program for the most intelligent application of the resolution so that there will be no basis for vague conjecture as to what we will do. It was agreed that there is a narrow area where we might use force to stop ships, and thus risk war.

(b) It was agreed that the resolution once passed by the OAS would not have the force of law under international law. The authorities would argue both ways.

(c) Holland was to see the Secretary regarding the need for legislation to authorize the President to use force in implementing the OAS resolution. It was noted that L believed that the legislation was necessary.

3. Status of Revolution

(a) Holland expressed the opinion that Castillo Armas had only 600 men, that he counted on the defection of the Guatemalan Army, that since this defection did not occur he would probably lose.

(b) Ambassador Barren expressed the view that if Castillo Armas loses we will probably lose at Montevideo.

4. Plans for OAS Meeting if Armas Fails

(a) Holland said that we must be confident and [illegible] that the OAS meeting is now more necessary than ever

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(b) We should send out the cable conveying the Secretary's note to the Foreign Ministers immediately. In this note we would say the meeting was more necessary than ever and that the current Guatemalan revolution should be handled separately.

(c) It was agreed that the failure of Armas would place us in a very weakened position at Montevideo.

A.A.Berle:Pearson:vk